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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to Section 78-2-1.6 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amended) which provides that the Supreme 
Court has appellate jurisdiction over fl(j) appeals from any 
court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction". 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
When attending a Sherifffs sale pursuant to a judicial 
mortgage foreclosure, can the judgment debtor request that the 
property be sold in lots or parcels. The standard for review is 
an "independent determination of the law". 
If a request to sell property in lots or parcels was made 
a judgment debtor but was ignored by the sheriff conducting the 
sale, did the court err in failing to set aside the sheriff1 s 
sale. The standard for review is "abuse of discretion". 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Section 78-37-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
provides: 
There can be one action for the recovery of any 
debt or the enforcement of any right secured solely 
by mortgage upon real estate which action must be 
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. 
Judgment shall be given adjudging the amount due, 
with costs and disbursements, and the sale of 
mortgaged property, or some part thereof, to 
satisfy said amount and accruing costs and 
directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same 
according to the provisions of law relating to 
sales on execution, and a special execution or 
order of sale shall be issued for that purpose. 
Rule 69 (e)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
CONDUCT OF SALE. All sales of property under 
execution must be made at auction to the highest 
bidder, between the hours of 9 o'clock a.m. and 5 
o'clock p.m. After sufficient property has been 
sold to satisfy the execution no more shall be sold. 
Neither the officer holding the execution nor his 
deputy shall become a purchaser or be interested in 
any purchase at such sale. When the sale is of 
personal property capable of manual delivery it must 
be within view of those who attend the sale, and it 
must be sold in such parcels as are likely to bring 
the highest price; and when the sale is of real 
property, consisting of several known lots or 
parcels, they must be sold separately1 or when a 
portion of such real property is claimed by a third 
person, and he requires it to be sold separately, 
such portion must be thus sold. All sales of real 
property, must be made at the courthouse of the 
county in which the property, or some part thereof, 
is situated. The judgment debtor, if present at the 
sale, may also direct the order in which the 
property, real or personal, shall be sold, when such 
property consists of several known lots or parcels, 
or of articles which can be sold to advantage 
separately, and the officer must follow such 
directions. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves a judicial foreclosure wherein Winferd 
Spendlove (hereinafter Spendlove) attempted to foreclose the 
interest of persons, who had interests junior to his own including 
the interest of appellants Jodel Ventures Trust, Dell F. Hatch, 
Trustee, Corey S. Mogelberg, Bernice Lehman, Encinosa Enterprises, 
Dell Hatch, Trustee, Dell Ransom Hatch. 
Course of Proceedings 
1. On January 19, 1990 the court entered a Nunc Pro Tunc 
Default Judgment in favor of Spendlove and against appellants 
pursuant to Spendlove's claim for judicial mortgage foreclosure• 
In addition, the court executed an Order of Sale on November 15, 
1990, in which it instructed the Washington County Sheriff to sell 
the foreclosed property, at public auction. 
2. The sheriff's sale was conducted on December 21, 1990 
pursuant to notice. The property was sold as one parcel to 
Spendlove for less than the amount of the judgment. 
3. On March 26, 1991, a Motion to Set Aside the Sale was 
filed by appellants. Spendlove filed a response to said motion 
and cross-motion asking the court to uphold the sale and enter a 
deficiency judgment. 
4. At a subsequent hearing the court denied appellants 
motion to set aside, affirmed the sheriffs sale and entered the 
deficiency judgment. 
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5. This appeal was timely filed seeking a review of the 
district court's decision to affirm the sheriffs sale and enter 
the deficiency judgment. 
Disposition in Lower Court 
The district court denied appellants motion to set aside the 
sheriffs' sale and entered the deficiency judgment requested by 
Spendlove. 
Statement of Facts 
1. On January 19, 1990 the court entered a Nunc Pro Tunc 
Default Judgment in favor of Spendlove and against appellants 
pursuant to Spendlove's claim for judicial mortgage foreclosure. 
In addition, the court executed an Order of Sale on November 15, 
1990, in which it instructed the Washington County Sheriff to sell 
the foreclosed property, at public auction. 
2. The sheriff's sale was conducted on December 21, 1990 
pursuant to notice. 
3. At the time of the sale, appellant Dell Hatch, acting for 
himself and on behalf of the other appellants, appeared and 
demanded that the property be sold by parcels pursuant to Section 
57-1-27 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
6. Appellee Spendlove and his counsel instructed the 
sheriff not to sell the property in parcels as requested by 
appellants, but to rather sell the property as one block. 
7. The property in question had been previously divided into 
parcels. 
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8. The sheriff then proceeded to sell the property as one 
block. The property was purchased by appellee Spendlove for less 
than the amount of the default judgement. 
9. On March 26, 1991, a Motion to Set Aside the Sale was 
filed by appellants. Spendlove filed a response to said motion 
and cross-motion asking the court to uphold the sale and enter a 
deficiency judgment. 
10. At a subsequent hearing the court denied appellants 
motion to set asidef affirmed the sheriffs sale and entered the 
deficiency judgment. 
11. This appeal was timely filed seeking a review of the 
district court1 s decision to affirm the sheriffs sale and enter 
the deficiency judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. A sheriff conducting a sale of real property, pursuant to 
a judicial foreclosure should sell said property in lots or 
parcels if said property has been divided into known lots or 
parcels or if he is instructed to do so by a judgment debtor. 
2. In the event that a request to sell in lots or parcels is 
refused by a sheriff the district court should exercise it's 
powers of equity and issue and order setting aside the sale (upon 
filing of a timely request) and direct that the property be sold 
in lots or parcels as specified by the judgment debtor. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE REAL PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS NOT 
SOLD PURSUANT TO STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS 
AND AS SUCH THE SALE IS INVALID 
Appellants contend that the sheriff improperly sold the 
property in question because he failed to sell the property in 
lots or parcels as required by statute. Section 78-37-1 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended) states that sheriff's sales regarding 
mortgage foreclosures are to be conducted in the same manner as 
sales on writs of execution. In pertinent part, the statute 
states: 
"Judgment shall be given adjudging the amount due 
with costs and disbursements and the sale of the 
mortgaged property or some part thereof, to satisfy 
said amount and accruing costs, and directing the 
sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to 
the provisions of law relating to sales on 
execution ...". 
Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the 
procedures for conducting the sale on a writ of execution. When 
dealing with a sale of real property consisting of several known 
lots or parcels, Rule 69(e)(3) states that "when the sale is of 
real property, consisting of several known lots or parcels, they 
must be sold separately...". A .plain reading of this provision 
would indicate that if property is known to consist of several 
lots, the sheriff must sell said lots individually even if no 
request is made by other persons. In this case the lots were 
listed separately on county tax records and were each owned by a 
different appellant. Accordingly, the sheriff should have 
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automatically sold the property in individual lots. The 
sherifffs failure to follow the statutory requirements of 
conducting a Scile renders the sale invalid. 
Even if we assume, for purposes of argument, that Rule 69 
does not require the sheriff to automatically sell the property in 
lots, the same rule would still require that the property be sold 
in lots if the judgment debtor is present at the sale and makes an 
express direction to sell the property in lots. Rule 69(e)(3) 
states in pertinent part: 
"The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may 
also direct the order in which the property, real 
or personal , shall be sold, when such property 
consists of several known lots or parcels, or of 
articles which can be sold to advantage separately, 
and the officer must follow such directions." 
In the case at hand, the judgment debtor was present and did 
demand that the property be sold in lots. Once again, a plain 
reading of the statute would suggest that if such a demand is made 
the officer must sell the property as directed by the judgment 
debtor. The failure of the sheriff to conduct the sale in 
accordance with the statutory requirements should render the sale 
void. 
Finally, appellants contend that it was an abuse of 
discretion for the district court to fail to set aside the sale. 
In the case of Mower v. Bohmke 337 P. 2d 429, (Utah 1959) the court 
addressed it's policy regarding judicial sales. In reviewing the 
propriety of a judicial sale the court suggested that a court 
equity did have equitable powers to overturn a judicial sale but 
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would only do so if the sale was "manifestly unfair". Subsequent 
cases have suggested that in order to meet this manifest 
unfairness standard the sale would have to result in unjust 
extremes where the interest of the debtor were sacrificed. 
Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Reality Services Inc. 743 P.2d 
1158 (Utah 1987). This rather strict standard is justified, in 
part, because of Utah's rather lengthy redemption period. 
Ironically, the manifest unfairness in this case relates to the 
redemption period of the judgment debtor. 
With regard to the redemption issue, if the subject property 
is sold as one parcel, the judgment debtors would have to redeem 
the property as one parcel by paying the entire price offered by 
Spendlove at the sale. This means that all owners of the various 
lots would have to redeem in order for any one owner to be able to 
regain his property. If one of the owners, of one of the lots is 
unable or unwilling to pay his share of the redemption price the 
others would have to cover his share of the redemption price or be 
precluded from recovering their own property. However, if the 
property had been sold as separate parcels, the parcels could 
individually be redeemed by the owner of each parcel. Since the 
lots were owned individually by each of the appellants, (not as 
joint owners of the entire parcel) it would seem manifestly unfair 
to treat them as one unit for purposes of exercising their 
redemption right. To do so, would effectively deprive them of any 
redemption right whatsoever and results in the kind of sacrifice 
of debtors interest that was contemplated by the court in 
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Concepts. Concepts Inc. v. First Security Reality Inc. 74 3 P. 2d 
1158, 1160 (Utah 1987) 
In addition, the judgment debtors, sought to have the 
property sold in parcels in order to obtain the highest price for 
the property. The debtor believed that by selling the property 
as single building lots, some persons would be interested in 
purchasing a single lot. By selling the lots as one parcel 
Spendlove Wcis able to eliminate from bidding all persons except 
developers that might be interested in developing or owning all of 
the lots. 
Appellants contend that both of these reasons demonstrate 
that the sale was manifestly unfair to appellants and as such the 
court should have exercised it's equitable power to set aside the 
sheriffs' sale. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument the court should determine 
that the sheriffs' sale was invalid as a matter of law and enter 
an order setting aside the sheriffs' sale. In the alternative the 
court should find that the district court abused it's discretion 
in failing to set aside the sheriffs1 sale and remand the case to 
the district court with specific directions for further 
proceedings. 
Dated this 18th day of December, 1991. 
Stanford Nielson ^ _ ^ 
Attorney for Appellants" 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
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HATCH, Trustee, DELL RANSOM HATCH and 
DEE SUPPLY, INC., 
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 88-224* 
Cross-Defendant. 
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THIS MATTER having come before the Court on Cross-
Claimant's motion for the entry of a deficiency judgment and for 
additional attorney's fees, and Cross-Claimant having appeared by 
and through his attorney Michael A. Day, of Thompson, Hughes & 
Reber, and Cross-Defendants having appeared through their attorney 
Stanford Nielson, the Court having considered the arguments of 
counsel and the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale executed by Cory C. 
Pulsipher, Deputy Sheriff of Washington County, State of Utah, and 
the affidavit of Michael A. Day, together with the pleadings on 
file herein, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Cross-
Claimant take judgment against Cross-Defendant Jodel Ventures 
Trust, Dell F. Hatch, Trustee, for the amount still owing Cross-
Claimant after sale of the property by the sheriff and application 
of the proceeds of such sale, together with interest thereon at the 
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from and after the date of 
sale, nunc pro tunc as of December 21, 1990, pursuant to Title 15, 
Utah Code Annotated, and together with additional attorney's fees 
as follows, to-wit: 
Deficiency $ 54,561.76 
Interest to 3/12/91 1,452.33 
Attorney's fees 1,750.00 
TOTAL DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT $ 57,764.09 
The total deficiency judgment shall bear interest at the 
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum as provided by law from the 
date of this judgment until paid, together with after-accruing 
costs of court and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Cross-
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Claimant in collecting the same. 
DATED this day of May, 1991, 
(_j2^£<*--
J/y PHILIP EVES 
ISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
"Stanford- Nl^lson 
Attorney for Dell Ransom Hatch, 
Dell F. Hatch, Joan Hatch, Jodel 
Ventures Trust, Encinosa Enterprises, 
Bernice Lehman, and Corey S. 
Mogelberg 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT was placed in the 
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Jodel Ventures Trust 
P.O. Box 643 
Bullhead City, Arizona 86442 
Mr. Stanford Nielson 
3760 S. Highland Dr., #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain 
Mr. Colin R. Winchester 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Mr. Clay T. Beesley 
Mrs. LaJuana Beesley 
2085 South 700 West 
Box 130-4 
Hurricane, Utah 84737 
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